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fair_trade_for_all [2010/07/02 14:05]
dan
fair_trade_for_all [2011/11/16 12:00] (current)
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 ====== Introduction ====== ====== Introduction ======
 +
  
 ===== Recent WTO History ===== ===== Recent WTO History =====
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   * trade facilitation.   * trade facilitation.
  
-Developing countries, wary of entering another bad agreement after the failures of Doha, have blocked progress on developed countries'​ target areas. ​ The US has largely responded to the stalemate by switching its attention to bilateral agreements with individual developing partners, a process which developing countries recognise maximises the US' power advantage.+Developing countries, wary of entering another bad agreement after the failures of Uruguay, have blocked progress on developed countries'​ target areas. ​ The US has largely responded to the stalemate by switching its attention to bilateral agreements with individual developing partners, a process which developing countries recognise maximises the US' power advantage.
  
 ===== Outline of the Book ===== ===== Outline of the Book =====
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 > [M]odern trade agreements have been extended into areas which intrude into national sovereignty with no justification based on the need for collective action and without clearly identified and fairly distributed global benefits. ​ The presumption of consumer sovereignty is based on the premise that society should only interfere with individual choices when those choices have consequences for others, when there is a need for collective action, and the same is true in trade. ---p86 > [M]odern trade agreements have been extended into areas which intrude into national sovereignty with no justification based on the need for collective action and without clearly identified and fairly distributed global benefits. ​ The presumption of consumer sovereignty is based on the premise that society should only interfere with individual choices when those choices have consequences for others, when there is a need for collective action, and the same is true in trade. ---p86
 +
  
 ====== Special Treatment for Developing Countries ====== ====== Special Treatment for Developing Countries ======
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 SDT is controversial. ​ Whilst developing countries argue that SDT is necessary to permit them to pursue appropriate trade policies, opponents argue that: SDT is controversial. ​ Whilst developing countries argue that SDT is necessary to permit them to pursue appropriate trade policies, opponents argue that:
   * it breaks the principle of reciprocity on which the WTO is based   * it breaks the principle of reciprocity on which the WTO is based
-  * according to neoliberal theory, protectionism that SDT encourages is inefficient and bad for developing countries themselves: they'd be better off if forced to liberalise completely (the problems with neoliberal assumptions ​was discussed in chapter 2)+  * according to neoliberal theory, protectionism that SDT encourages is inefficient and bad for developing countries themselves: they'd be better off if forced to liberalise completely (the problems with neoliberal assumptions ​were discussed in chapter 2)
  
  
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 > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. ​ And it is hard to conceive of a trade agreement that would prohibit the development of such technologies through defence programmes. ​ (Even the EU has complained about America'​s use of defence expenditures as a hidden subsidy for its aerospace industry.) ---p105 > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. ​ And it is hard to conceive of a trade agreement that would prohibit the development of such technologies through defence programmes. ​ (Even the EU has complained about America'​s use of defence expenditures as a hidden subsidy for its aerospace industry.) ---p105
 +
  
 ====== Priorities for a Development Round ====== ====== Priorities for a Development Round ======
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     * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member)     * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member)
     * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU)     * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU)
-  * institutional reform+  * institutional reform:
     * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries     * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries
     * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc)     * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc)
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   * China had to accept an extraordinary right of other members to use safeguards against it (beyond GATT [[http://​www.wto.org/​english/​docs_e/​legal_e/​gatt47_02_e.htm#​articleXIX|Article XIX]] and in violation of MFN)   * China had to accept an extraordinary right of other members to use safeguards against it (beyond GATT [[http://​www.wto.org/​english/​docs_e/​legal_e/​gatt47_02_e.htm#​articleXIX|Article XIX]] and in violation of MFN)
   * some LDCs have bound export subsidies at zero (far beyond many developed countries'​ commitments)   * some LDCs have bound export subsidies at zero (far beyond many developed countries'​ commitments)
- +
 > It seems strange that the WTO's developed country members should force acceding countries, particularly small and poor countries like Cambodia and Nepal, into such strong concessions. ​ Grynberg and Joy (2000) suggest that the motivation lies in the developed countries'​ desire to create a precedent that can be applied to future negotiations. ---p161 > It seems strange that the WTO's developed country members should force acceding countries, particularly small and poor countries like Cambodia and Nepal, into such strong concessions. ​ Grynberg and Joy (2000) suggest that the motivation lies in the developed countries'​ desire to create a precedent that can be applied to future negotiations. ---p161
  
fair_trade_for_all.1278075906.txt.gz ยท Last modified: 2010/07/02 13:00 (external edit)