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broken_nis [2008/03/03 23:19]
dan
broken_nis [2019/11/08 10:39] (current)
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 Similarly, with the transition of power from capital to the technostructure,​ the primary motivational force has shifted from compensation to the combination of identification and adaptation. ​ Considering that the reverence for the value of compulsion has not yet died, the task of convincing economists that compensation has given way to new motives within a substantial part of the economy will not be easy.  Yet, within the technostructure,​ this has already happened to a striking and decisive degree. Similarly, with the transition of power from capital to the technostructure,​ the primary motivational force has shifted from compensation to the combination of identification and adaptation. ​ Considering that the reverence for the value of compulsion has not yet died, the task of convincing economists that compensation has given way to new motives within a substantial part of the economy will not be easy.  Yet, within the technostructure,​ this has already happened to a striking and decisive degree.
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 The traditional view of the power hierarchy within a corporation runs something like that depicted in Figure 1. The traditional view of the power hierarchy within a corporation runs something like that depicted in Figure 1.
  
-{{nis_traditional_hierarchy.png|Traditional View of the Corporate Hierarchy}}+{{ nis_traditional_hierarchy.png |Traditional View of the Corporate Hierarchy}} 
 Figure 1: Traditional view of Corporate Hierarchy Figure 1: Traditional view of Corporate Hierarchy
  
 Power is supposed to stem from shareholders through the board of directors. ​ But power no longer lies with anonymous shareholders or in a board of directors that is now largely subservient to senior management. ​ Instead, the bulk of decisions stem from groups within the technostructure. ​ We might alternatively depict the corporation as shown in Figure 2.  Rather than illustrate the supposed flow of power, this separates participants by their level of commitment to and investment in the corporation. ​ There is a clear association between these and the varying motivations for involvement with the corporation. ​ On the periphery are shareholders,​ whose interests are purely pecuniary and who would generally move their capital to another corporation instantly if they supposed that it would earn a better return. ​ The next circle represents production workers, whose motivation varies by corporation. ​ In those in which work is monotonous and uninteresting,​ in which the corporate ethos appears to value profit above all else, which enjoys little respect within the community and in which layoffs are common, production workers are likely to be motivated primarily by compensation. ​ In corporations in which work is more skilled, varied and interesting,​ which perhaps have a more social role in society, which enjoy the respect of the community and which have a proven commitment to the job security of all their staff, it is likely that part of the production worker'​s motivation will come from identification with the firm.  It is highly unlikely that he will have any illusion that he can influence the firm, so adaptation is an unlikely motivator. ​ However, for those employees in the central core, identification and to an increasing extent adaptation are likely to dominate compensation as motivators. Power is supposed to stem from shareholders through the board of directors. ​ But power no longer lies with anonymous shareholders or in a board of directors that is now largely subservient to senior management. ​ Instead, the bulk of decisions stem from groups within the technostructure. ​ We might alternatively depict the corporation as shown in Figure 2.  Rather than illustrate the supposed flow of power, this separates participants by their level of commitment to and investment in the corporation. ​ There is a clear association between these and the varying motivations for involvement with the corporation. ​ On the periphery are shareholders,​ whose interests are purely pecuniary and who would generally move their capital to another corporation instantly if they supposed that it would earn a better return. ​ The next circle represents production workers, whose motivation varies by corporation. ​ In those in which work is monotonous and uninteresting,​ in which the corporate ethos appears to value profit above all else, which enjoys little respect within the community and in which layoffs are common, production workers are likely to be motivated primarily by compensation. ​ In corporations in which work is more skilled, varied and interesting,​ which perhaps have a more social role in society, which enjoy the respect of the community and which have a proven commitment to the job security of all their staff, it is likely that part of the production worker'​s motivation will come from identification with the firm.  It is highly unlikely that he will have any illusion that he can influence the firm, so adaptation is an unlikely motivator. ​ However, for those employees in the central core, identification and to an increasing extent adaptation are likely to dominate compensation as motivators.
  
-{{nis_motivational_breakdown.png|Suggested Diagram of Motivational Division within the Corporation}}+{{ nis_motivational_breakdown.png |Suggested Diagram of Motivational Division within the Corporation}} 
 Figure 2: Suggested diagram of motivational division within the corporation Figure 2: Suggested diagram of motivational division within the corporation
  
broken_nis.1204586360.txt.gz · Last modified: 2019/11/08 10:39 (external edit)